As activities to extend the operating life of nuclear facilities across the UK (including the fleet of Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGR)) are scheduled, a requirement to replace ageing and obsolescent equipment has emerged. Inevitably this requirement will necessitate procurement of modern equivalents of extant equipment which may include softwarebased, Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS), equipment. This paper describes the successful implementation of a programme of work to generate a safety argument for an item of pre-existing, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment for use in a safety system, to the satisfaction of the UK nuclear regulator.
Introduction
The existing Variable Frequency Converters (VFC) at both Torness and Heysham 2 have become increasingly unreliable due to ageing and obsolescence and the inability of the original manufacturer to continue supporting the equipment [1] . In December 2007, EDF Energy (then British Energy) issued a Paper of Principle [2] which outlined a proposal for (partial) replacement of the VFC with Variable Speed Drives (VSD). The drives selected were pre-existing, commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment, configured by a set of application specific parameters to customise its behaviour to meet the requirements for the EDF Energy installations.
Replacement of the VFC required approval, via a Category 1 Engineering Change Submission, from the Office of Nuclear Regulation (ONR), and demonstration of compliance with the requirements of IEC 61508 [3] on the basis that VFC are part of the post-trip cooling system (PTCS), a designated safety function.
In mid-2009, when the safety assessment of the drive was being planned, the current IEC 61508 'Emphasis' assessment process had not yet been properly established. Therefore, the assessment was planned using the EDF Energy PES Guidelines as the primary basis for the assessment, in line with the requirements of the ONR. Only Part 1 of IEC 61508 was referred to and then only as the basis for assessing the EDF Energy Project's arrangements for safety assurance of the final operational system. However the methodology presented within this paper is equally applicable to future programmes utilising the Emphasis tool.
Post-Trip Cooling System Description [1]
Torness and Heysham 2 are Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGR) nuclear power stations that use high pressure carbon dioxide gas to transfer heat from the reactor core to steam raising units. The circulated gas acts as a transfer medium both for normal operation and to remove post-trip decay heat.
At power the flow is controlled by Inlet Guide Vanes (IGV) mounted on a gas circulator impeller housing. Post-trip the IGV are opened and control is achieved by running the gas circulators at reduced speed. The gas is circulated around the reactor by the Gas Circulators of which there are a total of eight per reactor, with two reactors per station. The impellers of the gas circulators are driven by squirrel cage induction motors. These are embedded in the gas circulator housing which forms part of the primary circuit, and are not accessible during at-power operation.
The gas circulator motors are rated at 5.7MW at 2 pole speed (3000 rpm) and are normally supplied from the station 11kV, 50Hz supply with the reactor at power. Following a reactor trip the reactor residual decay heat requires to be removed and this is achieved by running the gas circulators at a variable speed determined by the reactor gas density, post-trip. The variable speed is achieved using a dedicated VFC which derives power either from the grid or from standby/emergency diesel generators. Each gas circulator has a dedicated VFC.
The VFC consists of a three winding input transformer, with a primary delta winding supplied at 3.3 kV, and two 30 degree, phase-shifted secondary windings supplying the two rectifier/inverter sections. The output of the two rectifier/inverters is summated at the primary winding of the output transformer.
Speed control is open loop, with the operating characteristics based upon test rig experimentation to determine the VFC characteristic which produces the required speed at a given gas density.
The selected replacement VSD is intended for use with standard and special three phase AC Induction Motors and Synchronous Motors and is based on a modern software based equivalent of the VFCs, available in a range of output powers and voltages.
The primary focus of the assessment, as it forms the key part of the programmable element of the VSD Control System, is the core software.
Functional Safety and Safety Requirements
COTS equipment is not commonly developed to comply with the requirements of recognised safety assurance standards and as a result, evidence of safety assurance (e.g. equipment safety case report, test evidence) is not routinely available. Initial assessment activities confirmed that evidence of full compliance to the process requirements of IEC 61508 was not available for the VSD.
The EDF Energy Engineering Advice Note (EAN) entitled Justification of Smart Instruments [7] , in line with the ONR requirements for safety systems and safety-related instrumentation, in particular ESS.27 Engineering principles: safety systems -Computer based safety systems, required a demonstration of 'production excellence' and 'independent confidence building' for product hardware and software.
The existing safety case for Torness & Heysham 2 requires that a failure of a VFC to operate on demand occurs at a rate of no more than 10 -2 failures per demand. The VSD are controlled by software executed on a microprocessor. It was therefore necessary to assess the integrity of this programmable element of the VSD against the requirement for a likelihood of failure to operate on demand better than 10 -2 .
The 'production excellence' and 'independent confidence building' assessment paths were conducted over a period involving two assessment phases, aligned with the two EDF 
Production Excellence Methodology
The intention of the 'production excellence' leg of the argument is demonstration of high quality from initial specification through to a commissioned system, e.g. evidence of application of software development in compliance with accepted standards. Evidence to support this argument is expected to be generated through detailed examination of the processes and procedures implemented during equipment development supported by evidence of implementation of these measures through audit of design documentation.
The 'Production Excellence' assessment was addressed within two distinct elements. The first element focussed primarily on the activities of the equipment supplier and addressed exclusively the requirements of the EDF Energy Guidelines for Using Programmable Electronic Systems in Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Safety-Related Applications (referred to as 'PES Guidelines') [5] . The second element focussed on the EDF Energy Project and its associated arrangements for safety assurance of the final operational systems and addressed both requirements of the EDF Energy PES Guidelines and applicable requirements of Part 1 (General Requirements) of the international functional safety standard for programmable electronic systems, IEC 61508 [6] .
The VSD selected for the EDF Energy application had evolved over a number of design generations and limited design and development information specific to the equipment was available. The evidence for 'Production Excellence' of the VSD was identified during a series of audits of the drive manufacturer and considered both the generic (core) elements of the Controller and the specific application of the Controller to the Heysham 2 and Torness application. Assessment was made against guidance for both the 10 -2 and 10 -3 integrity targets, to establish a margin of confidence above the 10 -2 level.
Independent Confidence Building Measures (ICBM) Methodology
The 'confidence building' leg is described by the ONR in (T/AST/046) as an "independent and thorough, reasonably practicable, assessment of the safety systems". The activity should be completed, by an independent individual or team, on the final product and assesses the realisation of the product against the design specification, development methods and applicable standards. The task also includes independent assessment of the test programme.
Implementation of the following set of ICBM was considered, based on the minimum requirements specified in Section 6 of the Smart Instrument Justification EAN [7] for a 10 
Assessment Results
Assessment of the drive against the PES Guidelines identified that the development of the equipment did not meet all the requirements in the areas of the system development process and verification for a 10 -2 integrity target. This result was not unexpected, given that the system was not developed specifically for safety applications, and the rigorous processes defined for safety-related systems were not therefore used.
Non-compliances identified in undertaking the 'production excellence' assessment were presented within a formal report and, where appropriate, compensating measures were developed as mitigation.
Progress in addressing the compensating measures and in identifying and implementing ICBMs were discussed within a set of progress review meetings and audits between ERA, EDF Energy and the VSD manufacturer.
Compensating measures
Whilst many positive aspects of the VSD Controller's development process were highlighted by the assessment, it was concluded that, without additional assurance to compensate for the shortfalls identified, the required safety integrity of the Controller for the PTCS application could not be substantiated. In order to address the shortfalls in existing assurance, a set of compensating measures were recommended, the key ones being:
 Additional reliability testing  Static analysis of the C / C++ source code  Analysis of prior use data.
Reliability Testing
It was recommended that reliability testing of the VSD Controller should be carried out by EDF Energy to increase confidence in the reliability of the Controller when used in the mode of operation that it will be used in when installed on the Torness & Heysham 2 plants. In response, the VSD manufacturer proposed an approach whereby the normal drive simulation testing and factory acceptance testing would be enhanced with additional test cases based on an analysis of failure mode scenarios.
Additional tests were recommended by ERA Technology, to be carried out at the actual operating conditions during Site Acceptance Testing.
Static Analysis
Independent inspection of the software against the coding standard outlined in the PES Guidelines and established good practice for C++ programming was recommended through application of a static analysis tool to check the C++ code. A programme of Static Code Analysis (SCA) of the source code was undertaken by ERA. The work involved the use of the SCA component of the LDRA TestBed tool on the whole of the source code. The VSD manufacturer's software development team demonstrated sound knowledge and understanding of the source code and was able to respond to questions arising from the tool analysis quickly and efficiently. ERA found that the software engineers involved in supporting the SCA exercise have extensive experience of the product and work in a stable environment with the support of application engineers who have clearly documented the requirements of the PTCS application.
The conclusion of the SCA was that the likelihood of there being a residual error in a critical component of the source code that could adversely affect the required behaviour of the PTCS application is very low.
Prior-Use Case
Further evidence from the VSD manufacturer's records and from organisations that use its drives could strengthen the claim that the software in the VSD Controller has proven to be reliable in use. At the time of the initial 'Production Excellence' assessment, the information available as evidence of reliable prior use of the VSD Controller did not include data that would allow assessment against Appendix F of the PES Guidelines. Consequently, it was deemed not possible to claim prior use as an immediate compensating measure. It was recommended that further evidence be sought from the manufacturer's records and from organisations that use its drives to strengthen the claim that the VSD Controller has proven to be reliable in use. EDF Energy has since conducted an analysis of prior use data provided by the VSD manufacturer. The resulting report concludes that, due to shortfalls in the prior use data made available by the VSD manufacturer, "analysis [of the data provided] can give no definite quantitative support that [the drive] would meet a 10 -2 [failure on demand] claim...". This conclusion is, however, qualified with the statement that "there is no indication that the drives would not perform with adequate availability/reliability." The report explains that, from the supplied data set, a total of 503 years of operation was extracted, spread over a sample of 231 drives and across all versions with the majority of data coming from the two most recent versions of the VSD design. Whilst this data does not allow a definitive claim to be made with respect to the 10 -2 failure on demand target, it does provide good confidence in the general trustworthiness of the Controller.
ICBMs
The following measures were selected in accordance with the minimum requirements specified in Section 6 of the Smart Instrument Justification EAN [7] and implemented as part of the safety assessment:
Type test
Rigorous functional and performance testing of the first production drive for the EDF Energy application was carried out by the supplier, in its test facility. This included full functional test of the VSD Controller. The test procedures were independently assessed by EDF Energy and ERA Technology. EDF Energy staff and ERA Technology staff also witnessed the testing as it occurred in the manufacturer factory and reviewed the test results and resulting FAT report. As part of the additional FAT tests, several supply interruption tests were successfully conducted.
EMIT arrangement
The finalisation of the Examination, Maintenance, Inspection and Testing procedures was identified as a condition of final acceptance for use of the VSD Controller as part of the Heysham 2 and Torness PTCS application. 
Commissioning tests

Manufacturer's Pedigree
Information on the manufacturer's pedigree was presented in the ERA Engineering Assessment report. From this information, it can be seen that the current organisation has a good pedigree. The VSD family of products has been available for over 15 years, and the organisation has been successful in achieving sales of 10,000 drives across the world.
EDF Energy Project Compliance with IEC 61508 (Part 1)
A series of audits of the EDF Energy project was conducted against applicable clauses of Part 1 of IEC 61508. The audits revolved extensively around the EDF Energy's Safety Plan developed to define the project's safety objectives, general strategy in terms of safety assurance activities and deliverables, to bring together the standard EDF Energy procedures applicable to the project. The results of the audits were detailed in a series of five 'Assessment Module Reports' containing a number of Observations and Minor NonCompliances, mainly regarding the completion of the safety documents, such as Validation and Verification Plans and the Functional Safety Audit Plan.
Conclusions
An Engineering Assessment Report was developed in accordance with an EDF Energy Engineering Advice Note (EAN) entitled Justification of Smart Instruments [7] and requirements provided by EDF Energy in progress review meetings. Subject to a specific set of acceptance conditions being fulfilled, the conclusion of the assessment was that the VSD Controller, configured with its application specific operating program, fulfils the safety requirements specified for its application as part of the Heysham 2 and Torness Post Trip Cooling System. The acceptance conditions included a need for the VSD manufacturer and EDF Energy to address a set of minor residual concerns associated with the VSD Controller design and documentation, and complete the outstanding, but planned, on-site system validation activities and finalisation of operation and maintenance support documentation. The assessment comprised two main assessment paths. The results of the first assessment path, 'Production Excellence', of the VSD Controller as supplied by the VSD manufacturer, confirmed that the VSD Controller and its development and assurance processes were compliant with the EDF Energy PES Guideline requirements for a safety integrity of 1 x 10 -2 probability of failure on demand or, where a compliance shortfall was identified as a result of the initial assessment, adequate compensating measures were implemented. The results of the second assessment path, 'Independent Confidence Building Measures', confirmed that a set of ICBMs, compliant with the minimum requirements of the EDF Energy EAN [7] for a safety integrity of 1 x 10 -2 probability of failure on demand were implemented successfully.
